History: 1919 to 1942
Following World War One, The Fort, still untested by war, was marked down for further modifications. A 1922 plan (left) of the Fort shows the 6-Inch Gun Emplacement where the 9.2 Inch Gun once was. and the abandoned emplacement on Mount Siloso. There were plans to modify the active emplacement for BL Guns rather than the QF models in-situ.
Fort Siloso was one of the artillery forts earmarked for further improvement following General Gilman’s visit to Singapore in 1927. He had been sent by the British Government to plan new defences for Singapore in order to protect the naval base which was to be built on the north of the island. As well as improvements to be made to existing forts, General Gilman had recommended the construction of several new forts with guns of up to 15-Inch in calibre. These would cover all sea approaches to Singapore, not just the harbour approaches. Two new Fire Commands would control the sea approaches to Singapore, Changi and Faber. Changi Command would cover the eastern approaches to Singapore and the proposed naval base, and Faber Command would protect the southern and western approaches to Singapore.
During the 1930s the Fort was updated and a Guardroom was built at the entrance to the Fort and Officers and Sergeants Messes were built on Mount Siloso. The Command post was greatly enlarged into the Battery Command Post and Depression Range-Finder seen today on Mount Siloso. The 6 Inch QF Guns were retired from service. Mark VII 6 Inch BL Guns on Mark II CP (centre point) Mountings were emplaced where the QF Guns had been The photo on the right shows the No.2 6-Inch BL Gun in 1946. The breech is missing as it was blown off when the guns were spiked by in February 1942. Two Twin Lewis anti-aircraft guns were set up at the entrance to the fort, where in earlier days there were 12-Pounder QF Guns. Two machine gun posts were also constructed. The Mark VII BL Guns were not the most modern of weapons at that time. They had actually been superceded by the Mark 24. Of the 6-Inch Coastal Batteries in Singapore, only the Sphinx Battery on Pulau Tekong received the more modern Mark 24 Guns.
The underground power house was enlarged into a major underground tunnel complex, the biggest in the Fort. The enlarged complex led down to Siloso Point, the old Malay name for which was ‘Sarang Rimau’ or ‘Tiger’s Lair’ as tigers once roamed this area. The complex now consisted of; an engine room, stores for fuel and ammunition and an Observation Post (OP).
At Siloso Point a Director Tower with a rapid firing 12 Pounder Gun were sited. It was planned that a Twin 6 Pounder was to be mounted at Siloso Point. However, when the defences were completed, none were available for the fort, although they were mounted elsewhere in Singapore (a Twin 6 Pounder was mounted at Siloso Point after the war). The 12 Pounder came from where the two Lewis Guns were mounted. There had been two 12 Pounders mounted there. The other went to another AMTB Battery defending approaches to Singapore.
Five searchlight positions were also constructed. These searchlights were not for anti-aircraft use, but to illuminate any suspicious vessel approaching the harbour.
In the years leading up to the Second World War, a daily exercise was conducted at Siloso Point. Every day, a ‘water boat’ passed through the harbour entrance between Siloso and Tanjong Berlayer. This boat, delivering water to outposts, was tracked, targeted and ‘sunk’ by the Siloso guns.
Elsewhere on Blakang Mati, Forts Connaught and Serapong were also being improved and their armament up-rated. The 9.2 Inch BL Gun on Mount Imbiah was removed and the emplacement was abandoned. Pill-boxes and machine gun posts were constructed at various places on Blakang Mati to cover the beaches. By 1941, the defences of Blakang Mati had been completed.
On the 8th December 1941, the Japanese landed at Kota Bahru in northern Malaya at 0215 Tokyo time (one hour and ten minutes before the strike at Pearl Harbor). Singapore had ready to deter a sea borne assault, a powerful coastal artillery defence system under the command of Brigadier A.D. Curtis, the Commander Fixed Defences. Twelve Coastal Batteries were on Singapore, Pulau Brani, Blakang Mati an Pulau Tekong. A little to the south east from Pulau Tekong, there was another 6 Inch Battery on the Malayan mainland at Pengerang. Faber Fire Command (7th Coast Artillery Regiment) controlled the Pasir Laba, Buona Vista, Labrador, Siloso, Connaught, Serapong, and Silingsing Batteries. Changi Fire Command (9th Coast Artillery Regiment) controlled Johore, Beting Kusah, Changi, Sphinx, Tekong and Pengerang Batteries.
The gun batteries were backed-up by four RAF airfields and infantry soldiers. Unfortunately, the RAF had precious few aircraft, and none of them front-line fighters. The infantry were desperately lacking in numbers and training, and there were no tanks. All things which had been recommended more than once to bolster the defences of Singapore and Malaya. To cap it all, the north of Singapore Island had very little in the way of defensive works. Successive British Governments and the War Office in London, had for years foolishly ignored recommendations for strong defences in the north of the island and in Malaya to be built up. They had a blinkered outlook on defence, and would not accept that any attack could come from the north. But come it did, and by the end of January 1942, the Japanese were at the gates of Singapore. The British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill later said the he had “no more thought of Singapore having no northern defences than of a battleship being launched without a bottom”. In saying this he, at the very least, misled Parliament and the people. When he was Chancellor of the Exchequer, he drastically cut Singapore’s defence budget, thus preventing essential defence works being carried out. He also clearly knew about the parlous state of the defences against attack from the north, having been warned about them more than once.
Since the Japanese attack on Singapore, a myth has developed and has been kept alive by those who really do not know the truth. This myth is that the Singapore guns faced the wrong way, i.e. South. This is incorrect, the guns did not face the wrong way. The guns were wrongly placed for an attack from the north, but as coastal artillery, which they were designed for, they were ideally located. With the exception of the Buona Vista 15-inch Battery and the southern-most (No. 1 Gun) 15-Inch gun of the Johore Battery at Changi, all the guns were capable of all-round or near all-round traverse. There were no impediments to the traverse of the 9.2-Inch Guns at Connaught and Tekong. With the exception of the Changi and Sphinx Batteries, concrete overhead covers were constructed at the 6-Inch Batteries to provide additional shelter for the gunners. Sphinx Battery, with its Mark 24 Guns had a steel shield completely covering the guns and the Changi Battery which apart from its gun shield was left uncovered. It is not known if such covers were constructed at Pengerang. The concrete overhead covers reduced the arc of fire of the guns where they were built.
To make things worse, for an attack from land, the guns did not have a lot of high-explosive (HE) ammunition. For the big guns, there was apparently only one fifteen-inch HE shell on Singapore Island. Being coastal artillery, all of the guns had plenty of armour-piercing (AP) ammunition 
which, as the name implies is designed to burst through armour plate before exploding inside a warship where it would do most damage. HE ammunition has a relatively thin casing, and explodes on or near the surface at the point of impact and the shrapnel from the de fragmenting shell causes tremendous damage to nearby troops and equipment. AP shells have a thick casing for penetrating armour plate. Used against land targets such as troops or artillery, AP shells bury themselves deep in the ground before exploding, and do not fragment like HE shells, therefore are not suitable for counter battery or anti-personnel use. Despite this, when the Japanese attacked, all the guns that could, fired on them using what HE shells they had followed by AP. The photograph shows a 9.2 Inch shell fired from Fort Connaught in February 1942 on the advancing Japanese. The shell was recovered from the Pasir Panjang area. It shows how little fragmentation there could be from an AP shell.
Having adequate stocks of HE shells may not have stopped the Japanese taking Singapore, the battle had been lost many years before it started, but Japanese casualties would have been much higher. The battle may have lasted longer and eased the pressure on Burma.
When the Japanese approached and launched their attack on Singapore, it is recorded that the guns of the Johore, Tekong, Connaught, Changi, Sphinx, Pasir Laba, Labrador and Siloso Batteries took part in the battle. It is not recorded anywhere that the Silingsing, Serapong or Beting Kusah Guns took part in the Battle. Post-war evidence indicates that the concrete canopies had not been partly demolished to enable the guns to bear on the Japanese. The location of these guns meant that the substantially built -up covers to the rear of the guns prevented fire to the west, from where the main Japanese thrust came from. The No. 2 gun of Serapong had had its canopy destroyed by a bomb, but it is still not recorded as turning and firing. It is likely that the top of Mount Serapong would have prevented this.
The Siloso guns engaged targets on land and sea. Tragedy struck on 10th February when the guns at Siloso opened fire on small boats approaching from the west. These boats contained gunners escaping from the gun battery at Pasir Laba which had been over-run by the Japanese. The overhead cover of the No.1 Gun at Pasir Laba was partly demolished to enable the gun to fire on the Japanese landing sites. The No. 2 Gun could not be brought to bear. It is believed that part of the concrete covers at Labrador and Siloso were demolished to enable the guns to fire on the advancing Japanese.
On the night of 13/14 February 1942, a ship was detected outside the minefields protecting the approach to Keppel Harbour. Information about this ship, stating that no British ship was in the area, was signalled from Fort Canning to C.C.M. Macleod-Carey, Second-in-Command of 7 Coast Artillery Regiment, who was in his Command Post on Mount Faber. Macleod-Carey ordered the searchlights at Labrador, Siloso and Serapong to sweep the area for the ship. A vessel of some 8,000 tons was quickly illuminated by the searchlights. It was then challenged by means of an Aldis lamp, but failed to respond with the correct identification signals. A naval rating, using a copy of ‘Jane's Fighting Ships’, identified the vessel as being a Japanese landing craft carrier, and the 6 Inch batteries at Labrador, Siloso and Serapong were ordered to open fire. Hits were registered almost immediately on the ship and it sank within a few minutes. This was what the guns had been designed for, and they performed exactly as required. MacLeod-Carey's version of events has been criticised for being incorrect, and it has been stated that no large ship was sunk, only a Tongkang (wooden trading vessel).
On the 13th and 14th February, the Siloso guns were turned on the oil installations on Pulau Bukom and Pulau Sebarok to the south west of Blakang Mati. This action was carried out in an attempt to destroy the installations before the Japanese could take them over.
Fort Siloso, as were other forts, was bombed by the Japanese. Pasir Laba and Labrador (Pasir Panjang) were put out of action. Bomb damage at Siloso was still visible in the 1990s, as can be seen in the photograph of the long abandoned 7 Inch RML position on Mount Siloso. The last traces of this damage were eliminated when the fort was restored.
On the 14th February at 0415 Hours, as recorded by Lt Col. H.D. St. G. Cardew, Royal Artillery, the Commander of 7 Coast Regiment, HQFD gave the order for the guns on Blakang Mati to be ‘spiked’ to prevent them falling into Japanese hands. At 0500 Hours the gunners destroyed the Siloso guns blowing the breeches off them with 40lb explosive charges. The men were withdrawn to Fort Connaught at 0630 Hours. One of the guns at Fort Serapong was destroyed at 1200 Hours, and the other on the morning of the 15th. Fort Connaught’s guns were also destroyed on the morning of the 15th. Later on the 15th, news of the capitulation of the Singapore Garrison reached Blakang Mati. An imprisonment of unspeakable barbarity and which many would not survive had begun.
Fort Siloso became a Prisoner of War Camp following the British Surrender. Civilians were also imprisoned at the Fort. The Japanese failed to repair the spiked 6 Inch Guns at Siloso, but did manage to recover and remount the 12 Pounder. The Japanese were successful at remounting one 6 Inch Gun at the Labrador Battery and one at Beting Kusah. They also managed to remount a 15 Inch Gun of the Buona Vista Battery. These repaired guns were never fired in anger by the Japanese.
NOTE
The term ‘spiked’ comes from the days of muzzle loading cannon. When guns were in danger of being captured, a metal spike was driven into the ‘touch hole’ at the breech of the gun with a hammer by one of the gunners, who had such spikes hanging from his waist. Once this had been done, gun powder could not be inserted into the hole and used to fire the propellant charge in the chamber, thus rendering the gun useless.